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Abstract 
This chapter attempts to identify whether product differentiation or geographical 
differentiation is the main source of profit for firms in developing economies by 
employing a simple idea from the recently developed method of empirical industrial 
organization. Theoretically, location choice and product choice have been considered as 
analogues in differentiation, but in the real world, which of these strategies is chosen 
will result in an immense difference in firm behavior and in the development process of 
the industry. Development of the technique of empirical industrial organization enabled 
us to identify market outcomes with endogeneity. A typical case is the market outcome 
with differentiation, where price or product choice is endogenously determined. Our 
original survey contains data on market location, differences in product types, and price. 
The results show that product differentiation rather than geographical differentiation 
mitigates pressure on price competition, but 70 per cent secures geographical monopoly.    
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1.  Introduction: Geography or Product for Promoting Development? 
 
What kinds of behavior by firms lead to what types of economic development? In order 
to consider this question, this chapter is motivated to identify what kinds of competition 
strategies firms adopt and produce profit. Firms are always under pressure from 
competition which may reduce their profit to zero or a negative figure. In order to avoid 
this outcome and to survive, firms will adopt a strategy of differentiation. Entrepreneurs 
and firms focus on how to make themselves different from others. Once differentiation 
strategies are set, firms will start allocating internal resources and shaping their 
organization. Their strategy will determine how they behave and how they look, and it 
may affect demand for substantial factors such as labor, capital and the profile of the 
development process of the economy. 
Sources of differentiation are extremely diversified because this diversity is the 
source of survival of firm. In this chapter, we examine product differentiation and 
geographical differentiation as two competing strategies. Differentiation in product is a 
well known strategy, particularly among Japanese industry. To succeed in differentiation 
of products, a firm needs certain capabilities, for example, precise research on 
consumers‟ preferences, research and development to produce new products, and an 
acute sense of style to give „trendiness‟ to their products or services. In contrast, if firms 
have successfully differentiated geographically in an industry, the firms‟ products may 
be quite homogenous because firms have little or no incentive to differentiate. Due to 
the smaller requirements for production technology in the case of geographical 
differentiation, firms in developing economies may prefer to adopt this strategy. 
However, the development of distribution technology or retail strategies may reduce the 
success of geographical differentiation. This chapter is motivated to present evidence on 
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what kinds of strategies have been adopted and have benefited the firms in the „real 
world‟ as a means of considering what kinds of strategies by firms may lead to what 
types of economic development. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
empirical methods which are undergoing extraordinary development in industrial 
organization studies. This development is likely to be strongly connected with spatial 
economy. Section 3 describes the background of this research, the dataset to be used and 
basic observations from the data. Section 4 reports on the structural model, estimation 
strategy and results. Section 5 discusses the extant problems and presents the 
conclusion.  
 
 
2. Literature Survey 
 
To identify the “source of differentiation,” we need a method of estimation for an 
endogenously determined market structure. The recent development of structural 
estimation enables us to capture the outcome of strategic interaction. According to   
Reiss and Wolak (2007), structural estimation can be defined as an approach that 
economic model is used to develop mathematical statements about how observable 
“endogenous” variables are related to observable and unobservable “exogenous” 
variables.  By doing this, researcher can estimate unobserved economic or behavioral 
parameters that could not be otherwise inferred from non-experimental data
1
. This 
approach is developing in a field called empirical industrial organization. In particular, 
research on two strands, estimations of demand system and estimation on decision to 
                                                 
1
 Experimental data can allow the researchers to infer structural estimates, but structure 
that economic theory provide will give more clear relationship with experimental data. 
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enter a market are accumulating. 
 If one focuses on a demand system where the products are differentiated and 
prices are set accordingly, you have to deal with the problem that price is not exogenous 
to the consumer‟s decision but rather is endogenous because the firm will set prices 
according to the expected preference of the consumer. Price is an endogenous variable. 
Use of an instrument variable to price may be the first idea to hit, but it is not easy to 
find good instruments that represent the heterogeneous preferences of all consumers in 
the market. Berry (1994) pointed out that the constants can be included in the choice 
model by the consumer to capture average effect of product attributes which are most 
likely unobservable. Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995) demonstrated 
that by transforming the market shares into a function of the unobservable product 
attributes that generates endogeneity on price, unobservable attributes appears as a 
linear term. By doing so, a traditional instrumental variable estimation becomes feasible. 
This approach forms a major strand of empirical industrial organization (see Nevo 2001, 
Train 2003: Chapter 13 ) In order to deal with endogeneity of price-product choice, it 
may help to conduct an experiment to obtain information on consumers‟ preferences 
(see Train 2003).  
 If one is focusing on the decision to enter a certain market, there again occurs 
the endogeneity problem. In a standard setting, firms will decided to enter a certain 
market when they expect profit, and this behavior is estimated by a discrete choice 
model such as probit. Among structural variables in the profit function, selling price and 
marginal cost are subject to strategic behavior and may become endogenous. If the price 
of a firm‟s products depends on number of rivals, firm‟s decision on entry to a market 
may affect the price. Particularly in oligopolistic environment, the number of rivals is 
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the outcome of strategic interaction among the potential entry firms and consists of 
essentially endogenous variables. Another problem is that the equilibrium of this entry 
game could be multiple and not unique.  
Berry (1992) dealt with this problem by taking numbers of firms in the market 
as a target of estimation in the flight route market of the airline industry in United States. 
Jia (2008) dealt with this problem by transforming a profit maximization problem into a 
search for the fixed points of the necessary conditions in capturing Walmart, K-mart and 
small retailers in 2,065 counties. This model allows for flexible competition patterns 
among all players. Seim (2006) employed a nested fixed-point algorithm solution in 
estimating the model for location choices in the video retail industry. Mazzeo (2002) 
proposed a two-stage estimation procedure à la Hekit in estimating the effect of market 
concentration and product differentiation in an observed configuration of high and low 
quality types in the motel industry. This chapter employs Mazzeo‟s (2002) two-step 
approach. 
Marginal cost, too, may become a source of endogeneity in an entry model. 
This happens when the marginal cost may be reduced when the firm decides to enter. 
This actually happens in a case of the chain store market, where a large chain may 
benefit by reducing distribution cost or advertisement cost when it sets off a „chain 
effect,‟ by its decision to enter.  Jia (2008) succeeded in capturing this effect.  
 In relation to spatial economy, the problem of location choice has an affinity 
with the later literature concerning the entry decision model. Theoretically, product 
choice and location choice have been considered as analogues in differentiated markets 
since Hotelling (1929). (See Andersen, De Palma, JF. Thisse 1992, Tirole 1988).  
Empirical studies on location choice and spatial competition emerged in the 2000s, 
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benefiting from development of the empirical method of endogenous market outcome. 
Regarding spatial competition, in addition to Jia (2008) and Nishida (2008) that  
applied a similar approach to a dataset on convenience stores‟ network building choices 
in Okinawa, Japan, Davis (2006) and Smith (2004) are conducting estimation on spatial 
competition. However, the latter two researches take the firm‟s location as given, then 
estimate quantity or price competition. Pinske, Slade and Brett (2002) proposed a 
semi-parametric approach to spatial price competition.  
 
 
3.  Background of Case Study on Pork Processing Industry 
 
3.1  Background  
Pork is one of the most important foods for the Chinese. The industry is currently 
undergoing a major transition, as prices and quality are now being questioned. In 2007, 
pork prices skyrocketed in China nationwide, increasing about 70% over the previous 
year. The direct cause of this price hike was an outbreak of blue-ear pig disease which 
attacked sows heavily in 2006. The industry was vulnerable to this shock, and 
production volume decreased drastically. A substantial portion of the production of pork 
still relies on individual farmer‟s backyard production; due to rapid economic growth, 
the opportunity cost of hog production for these farmers rose rapidly, and they easily 
abandoned hog production and investment in sows. In addition to direct shock of the 
disease, the high opportunity cost for farmers led to exaggerated shrinkage of pork 
production. 
 As concerns about quality arose, this scattered backyard production system was 
condemned again. The system made it difficult to conduct effective quality control, and 
the ill-motivated farmers fed poisonous fattener feed to their pigs, which triggered 
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several the toxic and fatal accidents in 2006. Despite these concerns which the scattered 
production system has generated, it has persisted so far. Could this be attributable to the 
nature of competition in the market? Strategies to earn profit may shape the production 
system both inside and outside of firms. So, identification of the source of profit and the 
impact of pricing of products became a focal point of the research and led to the launch 
of this study.  
 
3.2 Data 
The research described herein relied heavily on a unique survey conducted by the author 
and her colleagues. This section describes the data. 
  
3.2.1 Data sources 
The data on pork processing market was obtained from an original survey conducted in 
Jilin and Henan provinces in 2008 by the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, and 
the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science.
2
  The target of the survey was pork 
processing firms. The survey is unique in that it was designed to capture characteristics 
of transactions between the surveyed firms and their customers and suppliers. 
Demographic data such as population and fiscal expenditure of the county or city are 
obtained from „Guidebook to the Administrative Zone of the People‟s Republic of 
China,‟ and fiscal expenditure, a proxy of economic activity size, is from „Yearbook of 
Fiscal Data at the County Level.‟ 
 
3.2.2 Data description 
The dataset contains information on the characteristics of transactions and in both sales 
                                                 
2
 Mariko Watanabe of IDE, Jimin Wang of CAAS and Sachiko Miyata of the World Bank 
designed the surveys and conducted a pilot survey. The entire survey was conducted with the 
cooperation with local statistics bureaus.  
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and procurement. In this chapter, a market is defined as the administrative area in which 
the buyer is located, such as a particular city, ward, county or village. We have 
information on demographics and market structure, i.e., the number of competitors, as 
well. Samples were taken by asking firms to describe characteristics of transactions with 
a specific partner, not with the market as a whole.  
 The hog production industry in China roughly flows as follows: Farmers raise 
the piglets into pigs, middlemen pick up the pigs and transport them to the pork 
processing firms, and then the firms distribute them to the wholesalers, retailers or the 
wet market, or directly to the final consumer. Our survey focuses on the pork processing 
firms because they are an unavoidable link in the industry flow since the Chinese 
government permits only licensed processing firms to process pigs into pork as well as 
because they have substantial bargaining power in the flow. The structure of the 
transaction flow captured by our survey is depicted in Figure 1. The functions filled by 
the processing firms are as follow: (1) purchasing pigs, (2) slaughtering them (Raw 
whole body pork will be sold to the customers at this stage. All processing firms fill this 
function, and some processing firms focus only on this process.), (3) cutting into pieces 
and cleaning, (4) selling and transporting in a chilled, controlled environment as „chilled 
cut‟ pork, or (5) freezing and selling to the customers as „frozen cut‟ pork (Some 
processing firms engage in this process.) and (6) cooking the pork into products such as 
hams or boiled pork with soy sauce, etc. (Some firms do this in-house.). The pork from 
(6) is sold as „cooked products.‟ The dataset contains „cooked products,‟ but the number 
is very limited and the characteristics of products are similarity of products is more 
further to other three types consisting of „raw whole body,‟ „frozen cut,‟ and „chilled cut.‟ 
Thus, the estimations in this chapter omit „cooked products.‟  
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Figure 5-1: Transaction Structure of the Surveyed Firms:  Note. Figures for share and the number of buyers are the sample mean. 
Source: CAAS-IDE Survey 
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First, take a look at competitive environment: number of competitors for each 
transaction. Table1 reports that about 45 per cent of transaction (145 observation) was 
operating in monopolistic environment that number of competitor is zero. The second 
largest group are operating in an environment with one to 5 competitors (107 
observation, 32 per cent). As a whole, pork processing firms are operating in 
mono/oligopolistic environment, presumably succeeding in any kind of differentiation.  
When number of competitors is crossed with product types, raw whole body is listed 
most in the zero competitor environment (89 per cent, 130 out of 145 observation). 
When number of competitor is crossed with geographical market types, village markets 
shares 70 per cent (101 out of 145 observations) of the zero competitor market. 
 
Table 1-1: Number of Competitors by Commodity Type 
 # of competitors 
co
m
m
o
d
it
y
 
 zero  1-5 5-10 10-30 40-50 51-99 100 above Total 
         
1: Raw whole body 130 75 19 8 3 1 1 237 
2: Frozen Cut 1 8 9 3 1 3 2 27 
3: Chilled Cut 13 7 6 3 2 0 3 34 
4: Cooked pork 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
1+2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1+3 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 7 
2+3 0 4 0 1 0 0 2 7 
1+2+3 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 8 
1+2+4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1+3+4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2+3+4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
          
 Total 145 107 37 19 7 4 10 329 
Source: CAAS-IDE Survey 
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Table 1-2: Number of Competitors by Geographical Market Type 
 # of competitors   
  zero  1-5 5-10 10-30 40-50 51-99 100 above Total 
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
 
 
         
1:Urban market 17 22 23 8 4 4 9 87 
2: County market 21 25 5 4 1 0 1 57 
3: Village market 82 41 5 5 0 0 0 133 
1+2 6 5 2 1 1 0 0 15 
1+3 8 3 1 0 1 0 0 13 
2+3 11 11 1 1 0 0 0 24 
         
Total 145 107 37 19 7 4 10 329 
Source: CAAS-IDE Survey 
 
Then, what kind of differentiation was realized in the market? Configurations of product 
and geographical markets are reported in Table 2. With regard to commodity 
configuration, about 80% of firms concentrate on a single product. Among them, 
„raw-whole body‟ has the largest share in terms of the number of transactions. 
Regarding the geographical market, the mixture of market types is limited again, and 
the village market has the largest share in terms of the number of transactions. When 
looking at crossed commodity and geographical markets‟ configurations, there is an 
apparent trend in which „frozen‟ and „chilled cuts‟ are sold more in urban markets, while 
„raw whole body‟ pork sells more in village markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Table 2: Commodity Types and Geographical Markets 
  Geographical Market  
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
 
 
 1:Urban 
market 
2: County 
market 
3: Village 
market 
1+2 1+3 2+3 Total 
1: Raw whole 
body 
35 49 136 3 12 16 251 
2: Frozen Cut 21 5 5 3 3 0 37 
3: Chilled Cut 16 3 7 8 1 3 38 
4: Cooked 
products 
1 0 0 0 0 3 4 
1+2 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
1+3 6 0 0 0 0 1 7 
2+3 4 3 0 0 0 0 7 
1+2+3 5 2 0 0 0 1 8 
1+2+4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1+3+4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2+3+4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
        
  Total 93 62 148 15 16 25 359 
 Source: CAAS-IDE Survey 
 
 
Table 3 reports the results of regressions on commodity type, geographical market type, 
and marketing method on distance to customers. Distance to the customer determines 
the choice between „raw whole body‟ versus „frozen cut‟ or „chilled cut.‟ The longer the 
distance is, the more frozen cut or chilled cut are preferred. Choices between „urban 
market‟ versus „county‟ and „village‟ are determined by the distance. However, choice 
among marketing methods, such as „customer bears transportation‟ or „seller bears 
transportation,‟ etc., is independent of the distance to customer. 
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Table 3: Choice Sets and Distance 
 
Source: Author 
Commodity Type Geographical Markets Types Marketing Methods 
Coef. Std. Err Z valu P>z Coef. Std. Err Z valu P>z Coef. Std. Err Z valu P>z
1: Raw Wholebody 2: County 1: Self marketing
distance -0.01 0.00 -4.6 0 distance -0.01 0.00 -2.5 0.01 distance 0.00 0.00 -0.6 0.55
constant 2.74 0.25 10.9 0 constant 0.16 0.20 0.8 constant -0.37 0.13 -2.8 0.01
2: Frozen cut 3: Village 2: Own outlet
distance 0.00 0.00 0.8 0.41 distance -0.02 0.01 -3.4 0.00 distance 0.00 0.00 -0.3 0.75
constant 0.01 0.33 0.0 0.98 constant 1.20 0.17 7.0 constant -2.48 0.30 -8.2 0.00
1+2 1+2 4: Contract with retailers
distance 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.98 distance 0.00 0.00 1.0 0.33 distance 0.00 0.00 1.3 0.19
constance -2.09 0.71 -2.9 0.00 constant -1.88 0.32 -5.9 constant -2.34 0.27 -8.6 0.00
1+3 1+3 5: Other types of marketing
distance 0.00 0.00 -0.7 0.48 distance 0.00 0.00 -1.9 0.06 distance 0.00 0.00 -1.0 0.34
constance -1.34 0.55 -2.4 0.02 constant -1.05 0.28 -3.8 constant -2.03 0.25 -8.1 0.00
2+3 2+3 1+2
distance 0.00 0.00 0.3 0.81 distance -0.01 0.01 -1.8 0.07 distance 0.00 0.00 1.3 0.20
constance -1.45 0.53 -2.7 0.01 constant -0.44 0.24 -1.8 constant -5.36 1.12 -4.8 0.00
1+2+3 2+3 2+3
distance 0.00 0.00 -0.8 0.43 distance 0.00 0.00 2.2 distance -0.24 0.63 -0.4 0.71
constance -1.15 0.51 -2.3 0.02 constant -2.33 0.51 -4.6 0.03 constant -4.22 1.61 -2.6 0.01
1+2+3 3+4
distance 0.00 0.00 0.6 distance 0.00 0.00 0.9 0.39
constant -2.02 0.48 -4.2 0.57 constant -5.26 1.09 -4.8 0.00
Reference is urban market (1)
1+2+3
distance 0.00 0.02 -0.2 0.82
constant -4.93 1.03 -4.8 0.00
1+2+4
distance -0.24 0.63 -0.4 0.71
constant -4.22 1.61 -2.6 0.01
1+2+5
distance -0.02 0.10 -0.2 0.82
constant -4.79 1.13 -4.3 0.00
1+2+3+4
distance 0.00 0.00 1.5 0.13
constant -5.42 1.15 -4.7 0.00
Reference 3: Chilled cut 1: Urban market 3:  "customer comes to the factory" 
Prob >chi2 0 0 0.68
Pseudo Likelihood-236 -472 -415
# of obs 344 350 326
R2 0.10 0.11 0.01
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4. Modeling  
 
4.1 Set Up and Firms’ Behavior 
The model which we develop here is a two-stage game. In stage 1, firms decide which 
type of market to enter. We assume here that the firm will enter or stay in the market if it 
is profitable, or exit if not. In the second stage, firms set prices and compete. We can 
assume that the game between the firm and the buyer will proceed as follows: A buyer 
may offer conditions of transaction except price, and the firm will decide to accept it or 
not. Then, after a number of competitors become observable, the firm will set the price 
to compete with its rivals. This is a complete-information game in the sense that the 
player can observe the price, product type, market segmentation and other information 
that affects the price and profit. We assume that the firm will maximize its profit in a 
backward reduction. First in the second stage, the firm will set the price level so as to 
maximize its profit. Next, the firm will decide whether to enter the market according to 
the price level set in the first stage.  
 
4.2 Payoff Function and Pricing 
The payoff of the firm f is a product of price cost margin ( price vft  -  cost cft : t = 
transaction) and demand quantity dft, which is a function of demographics and economic 
size of the market m,  
 
  πft =  vft − cft dft βXm . 
 
Price is set at a level of marginal cost plus monopoly power, which is a 
function of the number of rivals in the market,  
 
vft = cft + δt Nftm  . 
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Marginal cost cft consists of the price of the pig pf, transportation cost tft 
and cost to quality maintenance qft,    
cft = pf + tft + qft  . 
   The firm will set the price vft as high as possible so as to maximize its profit, 
and thus the optimal price will be the marginal cost plus monopoly power. Firm-specific 
factor and market specific factor remained unobservable to researcher.   
 
vft
∗ = cft + δt Nftm  + σf + ωm + εftm    (1). 
 
   Under this pricing strategy, optimal profit would be the product of monopoly 
power, demographics and economic size of the market, 
 
πft
∗ =  δt Nftm  + σf + ωm + εftm  dft βXm   (2). 
 
   Purpose of firm in differentiating their product is to maximize their monopoly 
power, which brings profit maximization. Here the equilibrium is unique.  In this 
chapter, we will try to quantify monopoly power from two differentiation strategies, that 
is, sizes of coefficients of product differentiation δp and that of geographical 
differentiation δg , and compare which is more profitable for the firm.  
 
4.3  Estimation   
The final goal of estimation here is to obtain unbiased estimates of monopoly power 
coefficients δp  and δg  in the price function (1). In this chapter, we will take a 
Heckman two-step approach following Mazzeo (2002).  
 
4.3.1 Correction of Sample Selection Bias due to Differentiation 
Econometric problem here is that unobservable term  εftm  may be correlated with 
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observables, and in particular, coefficients of „number of competitors‟ δt , could be 
biased. The source of this bias is a fact that the number of rivals and the competition 
environment are endogenously determined with firm‟s differentiation strategy. If the 
firm decides to operate in the product/geographical market t, the firm will set price vft. 
Otherwise, we cannot observe price. This means that price vft is observable only in an 
area larger than any critical point z. When applying this to the truncated sample, it is 
known that we can obtain an unbiased estimator by explicitly introducing a selection 
mechanism. 
 Expected value of price with a truncated sample conditional on observables x 
(= cft + δt Nftm  + σf + ωm ) can be obtained as follows: 
E vft |x = E vft |x, vft > 𝑧 ･P vft > 𝑧|𝑥 + 0･P(vft = z|x). 
The conditional probability that price vft whose variance is σ is larger than any critical 
value z can be written as follows: 
P vft |vft > 𝑧 = P εftm > 𝑧 − 𝑥𝛽 x = P  
εftm
σ
>
z−xβ)
σ
 = Φ(
z−xβ
σ
), 
If any critical value z follows normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1, the 
expected value of some variable y with a condition that y is larger than critical value z is 
as follows, 
E y|y > 𝑧 =
 z 
1−Φ z 
 if z ∼ Normal(0,1). 
Here, the conditional expected value of unobservable εftm  becomes; 
E εftm |εftm > 𝑧 − xβ = σE  
εftm
σ
|
εftm
σ
>
z−xβ
σ
 = σ  
ϕ{(z−xβ)/σ}
1−Φ z−xβ σ  
 , 
Then, the expected value of price becomes the sum of observable xβ and  times of 
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inverse Mills ratio. 
E v|x, v > 𝑧 = xβ + E εftm  εftm > 𝑧 − 𝑥𝛽 = xβ + σ  
ϕ (xβ− z) σ  
Φ (xβ− z) σ  
  
       
ϕ ∗ 
Φ ∗ 
 is called the inverse Mills‟ ratio (IMR).  E v|x, v > 𝑧  is the sum of 
observable xβ and  times the inverse Mills‟ ratio. The estimation equation becomes 
as follows: 
   
vft
∗ = βcft + δt Nft + σf + ωm +  σtIMRt
f
f=1 + εftm . (1‟) 
 
4.3.2 Estimating probability to select market or geographical types 
The next problem is how to obtain probability to select configurations of product or 
geography. This can be formalized by the following discrete choice: If profit from the 
configuration is non-negative, firm will take the configuration.  
 
Dft = 1[πft =  vft − cf dft βXm ≥ 0] 
       = 1[πft =  δt Nft  dft βXm ≥ 0] 
 
Since the equilibrium is unique, the sum of the probability for all the product or 
geographical type configurations is always one. Maximum likelihood selects the 
parameters of the profit function that maximize the probability of the observed product 
or geography configurations across the dataset.  
The likelihood function of „geographical differentiation‟ is,  
L =  Prob[(Urban, County, Village)]f
observed
f=1 , 
and the likelihood function of product differentiation is, 
L =  Prob[(Raw, Chilled, Freezed)]f
observed
f=1 . 
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To estimate the likelihood function above, we use a maximum simulated likelihood 
(MSL) approach. As our problems entail more than two choices, ordinary probit cannot 
be used. Endogeneity correction method of truncated sample requires to the 
unobservable follows normal distribution, not i.i.d. extreme values, so we cannot use 
logit. Multinomial probit with simulation can compute the probability.
3
 
 
4.4  Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimates of probability for select product/geographical 
configurations. 
 Product-choice-probability estimates reveal the following relationship: Estimated 
parameters indicate the relative effects on profit and choice decision of differentiated 
market conditions. Firstly, relative values of constants indicate that any single product is 
preferred to a combination of raw whole body, frozen cut and chilled cut (constant of 
combination = -1.39 versus constant of raw -.51, frozen -1.33 and -.37 chilled) if all 
other observed variables are equal. Among choices in a single product, raw whole body 
is preferred in a markets that population is smaller (the coefficient of population is -.53) , 
and is in oligopolistic (the coefficient of dummy 1 to 5 rivals is .38) and is preferred by 
smaller firms (coefficient of sales = -0.1). Chilled cut is the opposite; it is preferred in 
monopolistic markets (coefficient of dummy of 1 to 5 rivals is -1.02, which is 
significant and the smallest) and is preferred by the larger firm (the coefficient of sales 
= .09). Frozen cut is chosen in more competitive environment (coefficient of 5 to 10 
                                                 
3
 Regarding details of multinomial probit, maximum simulated likelihood (MSL), method of 
simulated moment (MSM) see Stern (2000) and Train (2002). Simulation is used in these 
estimation methods so as to obtain a dimensional integral part of joint distribution among multi 
options that cannot be analytically solved.   
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rivals is 1, which is significant and the largest among choices), other conditions are 
valued in between those of raw whole body and chilled cut. 
    The results of geographical market choice estimates are somewhat complicated. 
The dataset contains six choices of configuration of geographical market choice. The 
constants of the six choices do not show systematic results. Only the constant of urban 
market is not statistically significant, and the other coefficients of choice are more or 
less at the same level. Coefficients for distance to the customers indicate that if the firm 
can accept longer distances, the firm chooses only the urban market or an urban-county 
or urban-village combinations. In contrast, a firm that cannot accept a longer distance to 
the customer prefers to supply at only the village market.     
 
 
176 
 
Table 4: Choice Probability of Product Configuration 
 
Note: „Transformed‟ variables are transformed as follows, so as to improve the efficiency of 
optimization: X transformed =ln(X/ Sample average of X).  
Coef. Std. Err z P>|z|
Probability of selling  raw wholebody pork only
Population(transformed) -0.53 0.10 -5.06 0.00 ***
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.11 0.15 0.73 0.47
Total sales of firm in 2007 (transformed) -0.10 0.03 -3.53 0.00 ***
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals 0.38 0.22 1.77 0.08 *
    5 to 10 rivals 0.30 0.30 0.99 0.32
    10 to 30 rivals 0.10 0.36 0.28 0.78
    more than 30 rivals 0.30 0.37 0.79 0.43
Jilin Province dummy 0.09 0.18 0.52 0.60
Constant -0.51 0.24 -2.14 0.03 **
Probability of selling frozen cut only
Population(transformed) 0.38 0.13 2.97 0.00 ***
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) -0.23 0.18 -1.27 0.20
Total sales of firm in 2007 (transformed) 0.12 0.05 2.53 0.01 **
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals 0.20 0.37 0.56 0.58
    5 to 10 rivals 1.00 0.37 2.66 0.01 **
    10 to 30 rivals 0.49 0.47 1.04 0.30
    more than 30 rivals 0.38 0.45 0.84 0.40
Jilin Province dummy -0.18 0.28 -0.62 0.53
Constant -1.33 0.37 -3.61 0.00 ***
Probability of selling chilled cut only
Population(transformed) 0.10 0.11 0.90 0.37
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.19 0.16 1.18 0.24
Total sales of firm in 2007 (transformed) 0.09 0.04 2.44 0.02 **
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals -1.02 0.35 -2.91 0.00 ***
    5 to 10 rivals -0.43 0.40 -1.07 0.29
    10 to 30 rivals -0.77 0.49 -1.59 0.11
    more than 30 rivals -0.11 0.44 -0.26 0.80
Jilin Province dummy -1.05 0.29 -3.64 0.00 ***
Constant -0.37 0.29 -1.28 0.20
Probability of selling any combination of raw, frozen and cilled
Population(transformed) 0.28 0.14 2.05 0.04 **
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.21 0.16 1.33 0.18
Total sales of firm in 2007 (transformed) 0.19 0.07 2.73 0.01 **
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals 0.71 0.41 1.74 0.08 *
    5 to 10 rivals 0.10 0.54 0.18 0.86
    10 to 30 rivals 0.42 0.62 0.68 0.49
    more than 30 rivals 0.19 0.47 0.41 0.68
Jilin Province dummy -0.69 0.38 -1.81 0.07 *
Constant -1.39 0.41 -3.42 0.00 ***
Log likelihood -310.6
# of observation 348
Wald Chi2 ( d.f.) 197.1 chi2(32)
Number of Draws in simulations  (GHK simulator) 5.0
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Table 5: Choice Probability of Geographical Market Configuration 
 
 Note:Variables „Transformed‟ are transformed as follows, so as to improve the efficiency of optimization: X transformed =ln(X/ Sample average of X)
Coef. Std. Err z P>|z| Coef. Std. Err z P>|z|
Probability of entering urban market only Probability of entering  urban-county market
Population  (transformed) 0.48 0.12 4.2 0.00 *** Population  (transformed) -0.08 0.11 -0.7 0.49
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) -0.25 0.16 -1.6 0.11 Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) -0.21 0.16 -1.3 0.18 ***
Distance to the customer (transformed) 0.12 0.05 2.3 0.02 ** Distance to the customer (transformed) 0.06 0.08 0.7 0.46 ***
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option) Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option) 0.08 0.24 0.3 0.74
    1 to 5 rivals 0.07 0.21 0.3 0.75     1 to 5 rivals -0.45 0.45 -1.0 0.33
    5 to 10 rivals 0.87 0.304 2.9 0.00 ***     5 to 10 rivals -0.10 0.52 -0.2 0.85
    10 to 30 rivals 0.19 0.36 0.5 0.61    more than 10 rivals -26869 . . .
    more than 30 rivals 0.63 0.43 1.5 0.14 Henan Province dummy 0.19 0.21 0.9 0.38
Henan Province dummy -0.13 0.23 -0.6 0.58 Constant -1.32 0.35 -3.7 0.00 ***
Constant -0.26 0.22 -1.2 0.23
Probability of entering county market only Probability of entering  urban-village market
Population  (transformed) -0.22 0.12 -1.8 0.07 * Population  (transformed) -0.19 0.13 -1.4 0.16
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) -0.17 0.13 -1.3 0.19 Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.74 0.20 3.8 0.00 ***
Distance to the customer (transformed) -0.01 0.06 -0.2 0.85 Distance to the customer (transformed) 0.31 0.06 5.3 0.00 ***
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option) Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals 0.35 0.20 1.7 0.09 *     1 to 5 rivals 0.17 0.40 0.42 0.68
    5 to 10 rivals 0.20 0.32 0.6 0.54     5 to 10 rivals -0.47 0.44 -1.06 0.29
    10 to 30 rivals 0.50 0.40 1.2 0.22     10 to 30 rivals -0.41 0.45 -0.92 0.36
    more than 30 rivals 0.00 0.51 0.0 1.00     more than 30 rivals -0.14 0.60 -0.24 0.81
Henan Province dummy 0.34 0.18 1.9 0.06 * Henan Province dummy -0.02 0.38 -0.06 0.96
Constant -1.58 0.29 -5.5 0.00 *** Constant -1.01 0.25 -4.02 0.00 ***
Probability of entering village market only Probability of entering county-village market
Population  (transformed) -0.37 0.10 -3.6 0.00 *** Population  (transformed) 0.08 0.16 0.5 0.61
Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.32 0.15 2.1 0.03 ** Fiscal expenditure size of the market area (transformed) 0.20 0.20 1.0 0.31
Distance to the customer (transformed) -0.31 0.07 -4.2 0.00 *** Distance to the customer (transformed) 0.11 0.07 1.7 0.09 *
Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option) Number of competitors (index; "zero" is the reference option)
    1 to 5 rivals -0.11 0.18 -0.6 0.55     1 to 5 rivals -0.38 0.27 -1.4 0.16
    5 to 10 rivals -0.48 0.32 -1.5 0.13     5 to 10 rivals -0.41 0.57 -0.7 0.47
    10　to 30 rivals -0.13 0.41 -0.3 0.76     10 to 30 rivals -17.38 . . .
   more than 30 rivals -8.35 . . .     more than 30 rivals -0.40 0.60 -0.7 0.51
Henan Province dummy 0.02 0.17 0.1 0.90 Henan Province dummy -0.57 0.28 -2.0 0.05 **
Constant -1.38 0.32 -4.4 0.00 *** Constant -0.79 0.30 -2.7 0.01 ***
Log likelihood -584.9
# of observation 346
Wald Chi2 ( d.f.)
Number of Draws in simulations  (GHK simulator) 5.0
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 Table 6 reports the results of price regressions. What we focus on in this chapter is the 
coefficients of number of rivals δt . The first column indicates the result of the price 
regression (1‟) without correction of endogeneity. The second indicates the result of the 
endogeneity correction by inserting the inverse Mills‟ ratio from product configuration 
choice estimation. Coefficients of the number of rivals δp  becomes larger than 
regression without endogeneity correction for more than 5 competitors, but significant 
only for the case with more than 30 competitors. The coefficients show how much the 
price would increase/decrease compared to the zero-competitor environment. The 
magnitude of impact on price reduction is for the group with more than 30 competitors, 
2.1 RMB. This implies if product differentiation strategy taken, price is less elastic till 
the competitors becomes as large as 30.  What is interesting is if the customer will do 
inspection of products, selling price is significantly reduced.  
The third column reports the impact of geographical differentiation. The 
coefficients of the number of rivals δg  are significant and negative for the group with 1 
to 5 competitors. Its magnitude is larger than in the case of product differentiation. With 
the appearance of competitors numbering 1 to 5, the selling price is reduced by 4.2 
RMB, which is the twice of the amount in the case of product differentiation. This 
suggests that geographical differentiation can mitigate price reduction pressure less than 
product differentiation.   
 Coefficients of the inverse Mills‟ ratio term are not strongly significant for both 
the product-differentiated and the geographical-differentiated market. Coefficients of 
the terms for frozen cut only are weakly significant and negative. This suggests that 
there are unobserved factors which affect both observed price and product choice 
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probability in the opposite way. For example, if some factor encourages the choice to 
sell only raw whole body, this will exert pressure on price.   
 There are some interesting results in relation to spatial economy. First, distance 
to the customer has no power to explain price level. This is consistent for all the 
estimation here. Secondly, a certain type of marketing and transportation method 
matters price. Our data contains information on the transporting-marketing method: (1) 
it is the seller firm that does marketing to the customer and transports the goods at the 
seller‟s cost, (2) firms set up their own marketing outlets, (3) it is the customer who 
goes to the firm and bears the transport cost, (4) it is the contracted distributor who does 
the transportation and (5) others. Among these, „(1) the seller firm will bear the 
marketing and transportation cost‟ is significant and positive. This means that if the 
seller firm bears the transportation cost, then the selling price can be raised. However, if 
the buyer bears the marketing and transportation cost, then the selling price is not 
affected. Thus, there is asymmetry in the cost-bearing of transportation.   
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Table 6: Price functions: Two differentiation strategies 
 
Source: Author   
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to quantify the impact of the differentiation strategy of firms on 
price. It then compared the magnitude of price reduction pressure which results from the 
two differentiation strategies of product differentiation and geographical differentiation. 
The results suggest that, in the pork processing industry in China, product 
differentiation exhibits stronger power than geographical differentiation when it comes 
to mitigating the price reduction pressure exerted by competition. This results suggest 
Base Product differentiation Geographical Differentiation
Coef. S.E. t P>|t| Coef. S.E. t P>|t| Coef. S.E. t P>|t|
Cost :  β
Purchase price of pigs 0.001 0.00 2.13 0.03 ** 0.001 0.00 1.81 0.07 * 0.001 0.001 1.58 0.12
Distance to the customer 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.63 0.00 0.00 -0.49 0.63
Transportation  method
    Self marketing- transporation 2.13 0.83 2.57 0.01 ** 1.79 0.85 2.09 0.04 ** 1.66 1.36 1.23 0.22
    Own outlet 0.01 1.09 0.00 1.00 0.23 1.15 0.20 0.84 0.20 1.61 0.13 0.90
    Customer does transportation 0.51 0.81 0.63 0.53 0.27 0.82 0.33 0.75 0.12 1.30 0.09 0.93
    Transporation due to contract 0.86 0.95 0.90 0.37 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.33 1.48 1.49 1.00 0.32
    Other types of marketing 1.90 1.34 1.42 0.16 1.71 1.32 1.29 0.20 2.03 1.62 1.25 0.21
Quality control by the customer 
   Customer do inspection on slaughtering -0.85 0.49 -1.75 0.08 * -0.88 0.51 -1.72 0.09 * -0.85 0.54 -1.58 0.12
   Custmer inspect processing site periodically -1.19 0.50 -2.39 0.02 ** -1.21 0.54 -2.24 0.03 ** -1.02 0.54 -1.89 0.06 **
Number of competitors: δ
1 to 5 -0.81 0.44 -1.86 0.06 * -0.6 1.51 -0.42 0.68 ** -4.84 2.82 -1.71 0.09 **
5 to 10 -0.21 0.64 -0.33 0.74 -2.2 1.49 -1.50 0.14 -14.7 10.19 -1.44 0.15
10 to 30 -1.25 0.92 -1.37 0.17 -1.7 1.39 -1.20 0.23 ** 72.9 53.0 1.38 0.17
30 - -1.18 0.90 -1.32 0.19 -2.1 1.20 -1.77 0.08
Endogeneity correction term
Mills ratio for raw wholebody only -2.01 1.68 -1.20 0.23
Mills ratio for frozen cut only -2.39 1.53 -1.56 0.12
Mills ratio for chilled cut only -0.42 0.96 -0.44 0.66
Mills ratio for configulation of any three 0.90 0.97 0.92 0.36
Mills ratio for urban market only -4.33 3.42 -1.27 0.21
Mills ratio for county market only -25.1 16.8 -1.49 0.14 *
Mills ratio for village market only 3.07 2.58 1.19 0.24
Mills ratio for urban-county 0.91 0.88 1.03 0.31
Mills ratio for urban-village -5.11 3.58 -1.43 0.16 *
Mills ratio for county-village 22.5 16.6 1.36 0.18
Constant 18.32 1.23 14.83 0.00 42.0 18.12 2.32 0.02 31.42 10.52 2.99 0.00
# of observation 313 313 313
R-squared 0.118 0.137 0.129
181 
 
that this difference may encourage firms to invest more in facilities that upgrading 
product quality rather than securing geographical monopoly. However, the reality is 
opposite. Most of our data set firms stay in geographical monopolistic positions thanks 
to some power. The results reject that the power that secures geographical monopoly is 
not distance to the customer or transportation cost. The results support that small 
fragmented market may have inhibited spreading of high-quality pork production.  
 Development of the empirical method to differentiated markets or markets with 
strategic interaction allows us to identify the location choice of the firms and to quantify 
the impact of this choice on firms‟ profit. Henceforth, the combination of the techniques 
of empirical industrial organization and spatial economy has the potential to produce 
further valuable research findings. 
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